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The triumph of the Darwinian theory of evolution was by no means a foregone conclusion. 
On the first publication of The Origin of Species (1859) the scientific community was not 
immediately convinced by this apparently overly sweeping “speculation” (Bellon 395). It 
took further and more modest publications by Darwin, which enabled fellow naturalists to 
defend his credentials as a practitioner of painstaking induction, to gain him advocates 
within the establishment by the end of the 1860s. Even then, nominal acceptance or even 
celebration of Darwin’s breakthroughs was not necessarily the same as full-scale 
assimilation. As Peter J. Bowler has compellingly argued, non-Darwinian forms of 
evolution continued to predominate through the rest of the nineteenth century, as scientists 
seized on elements of Darwin’s theories and grafted them onto a progressive narrative 
(Bowler 76–90). Even his “bulldog” T. H. Huxley, and his popularizer Herbert Spencer, 
championed some aspects at the expense of others: Spencer’s famous coinage “the survival 
of the fittest” implies an upward teleology quite absent from Darwin’s own idea of species 
as fit for (current) purpose and environment. Such distortion is clear to see in Ernst 
Haeckel’s famous tree-diagram of the “Pedigree of Man” (1879), which at first glance 
adopts Darwin’s branching structure, but which is rooted in the medieval ideal of the Great 
Chain of Being: it shows Man’s ancestors rising up through the great trunk of the tree, 
holding firm as other species deviate from this ideal, to emerge triumphant at its crown 
(Haeckel 188 facing; Bowler 89).  
George Eliot’s first record of reading the Origin displays a similar blindness to its 
mechanism of random mutation and adaptation to circumstance, describing it in a letter 
  
merely as “an elaborate exposition of the evidence in favour of the [pre-existing] 
Development Theory” (Haight 214). Eliot is nonetheless notable for her growing 
recognition of the implications of Darwinian theory, and her immersive engagement with its 
language and structures – what Gillian Beer (1983) has influentially termed Darwin’s Plots. 
The plot it most disturbed was the relationship between the individual and history. In a 
world of infinitesimal mutation and invisible selection that encompassed all species 
indiscriminately, and was both constant and unstoppable, what agency or significance could 
any one individual have? As Beer puts it, “Darwin drew on familiar narrative tropes” 
(Darwin’s Plots xxiv) and discussed “old problems” in new lights (Darwin’s Plots 17). In 
this article, I will draw attention to the strange and often surprising parallels drawn between 
human and animal (and occasionally plant) species in Felix Holt (1866) and Middlemarch 
(1871–72). By the time she was writing these novels, Eliot seemed to feel that there was no 
getting away from Darwin’s theory and its ramifications. It had to be acknowledged in any 
forward-thinking writer’s view of the world. 
Eliot’s novels are notable for their particular pre-occupation with the period of the 
1832 Reform Act, on the cusp of what we might see as the “long” Victorian era. Although 
both Felix Holt and Middlemarch were written in the wake of the Darwinian controversy, 
both are set back in time to that Reform moment, and both depict provincial Midland 
communities. This distance between Eliot’s characters and her readers – as well as the two 
parts of herself, her provincial childhood as Mary Ann Evans and her metropolitan 
novelistic career as “George Eliot” / “Mrs Lewes” – is the subject of considerable irony. 
Eliot is often thought of as a strictly, even sometimes overly serious realist writer, but in her 
elision of human and animal species she does something quite disconcertingly comic in 
these novels. This article will consider the vexed question of why she does it, and what the 
implications might be. 
  
In his magisterial The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the 
Protagonist in the Novel (2003), Alex Woloch suggests that in her famous image in 
Middlemarch of the “roar on the other side of silence,” Eliot “simultaneously registers the 
imperative to look at the masses of ‘ordinary life’ and anxiously worries that the sight might 
be too much”(32). He characterizes Eliot as “caught between idealism and anxiety, between 
including and distorting minor characters, in the double pull of democracy and inequality” 
(32). I propose that Eliot’s invocation of a profusion of animal species in her novels, 
including elision between humans and animals, has a twofold significance. First and most 
obviously, it is a self-conscious recognition of the Darwinian framework in which all 
scientifically engaged thinkers were forced to view the world by the 1870s. Eliot was living 
in a post-Darwinian universe, and she is very aware of this gulf that separates her from her 
blissfully ignorant 1830s characters. Secondly, it is inextricably part of her novels’ 
engagement in history-writing. Their precise temporal location within living memory sets 
them at a distance that is both rich with potential ironies and unnervingly proximate: a 
“double pull,” to adapt Woloch’s phrase. These novels are thus an intervention in 
contemporary history writing. 
The unnerving proximity of the period within living memory results in part from its 
inherent multiplicity. Our experience of the present is made up of constant and infinitely 
varying sense impressions, which are impossible to distil into any singular generalization. 
And this individual experience is exponentially exacerbated if we try to write a historical 
narrative, characterizing the experience of a living population beyond ourselves. As I have 
shown elsewhere, this was a particular source of discomfort for Victorian historians 
(Kingstone, “Victorian Historiography and the Recent Past”; Kingstone, Victorian 
Narratives of the Recent Past). In a period that sought grand teleological narratives, many 
historians avoided writing about the contentious recent past: as Thomas Macaulay 
  
described it, “there are great and obvious objections to contemporary history” (Trevelyan, 
II, 13–14). Filtering “historic” individuals who deserve commemoration from those whom 
Eliot provocatively terms “unhistoric” is much more difficult when those people, or others 
who remember them, are still alive. In the Victorian period, therefore, the impulse to write 
history of the period within living memory was dispersed into other genres including the 
novel, which could engage more easily with the experience of unmanageable multiplicity.
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One way in which Eliot creates such a heightened sense of multiplicity, as I will 
demonstrate, is through human-animal elision. 
The first half of this article shows Eliot adopting Darwinian paradigms to highlight 
the proximity between humans and animals, and thus – once humans step down from their 
Biblical plinth – the lateral profusion of the organic world. The second half shows the 
tangles this Darwinian thinking causes for Eliot the humanist. The multiplicity of 
contemporaneous sensory experience is multiplied exponentially if Eliot’s famous call for 
interpersonal sympathy is expanded across species boundaries. As a result, she ends up 
suggesting that despite Darwin, we have to maintain lines of demarcation. Despite the 
clamoring voices of other organisms, we can only function as human beings – and 
sympathize with our fellow humans – if we block them out.  
 
Animals and social hierarchy 
Scientific discourses pervade Eliot’s work. As Sally Shuttleworth has shown, “Middlemarch 
is the first novel in which science is treated as an explicit theme,” and it is also present in 
many more implicit ways (143). As early as their trip to Ilfracombe in 1856, when her 
partner G. H. Lewes was researching his Sea-Side Studies, Eliot was using zoological 
analogies for human processes: looking down over the town from the top of a nearby hill, 
she mused that “one cannot help thinking of man as a parasitical animal – an epizoon 
  
making his abode on the skin of the planetary organism. … we begin to think of the strong 
family likeness between ourselves and all other building, burrowing house-appropriating 
and shell secreting animals” (The Journals of George Eliot 265).  
Beer has delineated how Eliot’s novels were pervasively – even frustratingly, for her 
first readers and reviewers – saturated with scientific allusions and imagery (Darwin’s Plots 
139). We can see this particularly in Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life. From its 
subtitle onwards, it announces itself – perhaps unprepossessingly for novel-readers – in the 
form of a scientific “study.” The Prelude continues in this vein, from the opening question 
that proposes to subject “man” to “the varying experiments of Time” to the statement “the 
limits of variation [among women] remain much wider than any one would imagine from 
the sameness of women’s coiffure and the favourite stories in prose and verse” (25–26). 
This detached rhetoric helps facilitate Eliot’s masculine persona, though it requires an 
awkward direct article – “the favourite stories” – to avoid the problem of whether to say 
“their” or “our.” This satirical comment on blanket essentialisation of women also evokes 
Darwin’s theories in its reference to “the limits of variation,” to challenge those who would 
see women as homogeneous. The parallels between Darwin’s and Eliot’s use of 
evolutionary narrative tropes have been compellingly traced by Beer. One element she does 
not discuss, however, which sheds valuable light on the question of how writers judged the 
limits of historicity and personhood, is Eliot’s habit of eliding humans and animals. This 
Darwinian conception of the human race as merely one among other species was perceived 
by many of his readers as a demotion, as the many contemporary cartoons of him as an ape 
remind us (The Hornet; Fun; Punch). Darwin’s removal of species hierarchy heightened the 
sense of multiplicity already manifested in contemporaneous experience, and removes one 
possible criteria by which to sift for significance. 
  
This sense of potentially overwhelming multiplicity is immanent in Darwin’s Origin 
of Species. Two of the most memorable images in his treatise depict an “entangled bank” 
(Darwin 74, 490). This appears to present a chaotic spectacle for the biologist, as the 
entanglements of contemporary experience do for the historian. However, as Darwin 
stresses, although “when we look at the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank, we 
are tempted to attribute their proportional numbers and kinds to what we call chance ... how 
false a view is this!” (74). There is regularity and reasoning underlying these proportions, 
even if it is not laid down by humans. In the midst of the book, he repeatedly emphasizes 
the complexity and opacity of his subject-matter: 
Throw up a handful of feathers, and all must fall to the ground according to definite laws; but 
how simple is this problem compared to the action and reaction of the innumerable plants and 
animals which have determined, in the course of centuries, the proportional numbers and 
kinds of trees now growing on the old Indian ruins! (75) 
In the first part of this comparison, Darwin draws on the Galilean precedent that disproved 
expectations about relative weights and velocities by dropping a feather and stone (or 
hammer, or brick) from the Tower of Pisa; but he turns it into a much more homely action, 
that of a pigeon-fancier or a keeper of chickens. In the second half of the comparison, 
moreover, he contrasts this straightforward physics experiment with what he suggests are 
the more complex studies of natural history. Here he elides his subject not with physics but 
with human history.  
At the book’s conclusion, by contrast, this embattled Christian is much keener to 
reassure his readers that his theories are compatible and commensurate with religious faith. 
As such, he gestures towards a God who had “originally breathed [life] into a few forms or 
into one” (490). This hint, insufficient to prevent furore, was amplified in the second edition 
with an inserted “by the Creator,” and an additional comment from an anonymised Charles 
  
Kingsley that divine creation of a single original form offers “just as noble a conception of 
the Deity” (Darwin 481; Kingsley). In 1859, at least, Darwin was keen to reassure readers 
that there was order at the base of both animal and human life. 
This is something of which Eliot seems much less sure. As Karen Mann has traced 
through Felix Holt, the eponymous would-be demagogue repeatedly makes comparisons 
between people and animals, only to reject their applicability to himself: he “thank[s] 
Heaven” he is “not a mouse” like Esther Lyon who minds the smell of tallow (Eliot, Felix 
Holt, 140). He looks scathingly back on the period of debauchery when he “was making a 
hog of [him]self.” (142) And he describes self-interested election candidates as “cod-fish” 
unlike himself (238). Mann comments, “One is tempted to remark that it is his very 
condemnation of the animal nature of man which brings about Felix’s downfall” (208). It is 
his “attempts to separate his animal nature from his thinking nature (and so deny the 
former)” that lead to “repressive behaviour” and a compromising lack of self-awareness 
(Mann 208–9). In Mann’s examples, where Felix is making the comparisons, we know 
clearly who is human and who is animal. But when we widen our net to examine free 
indirect discourse and narratorial commentary, the distinctions become much more blurred.  
The narrators of Felix Holt and Middlemarch repeatedly employ transferred imagery 
– using equivalents from elsewhere on the evolutionary scale – to allow them (and us) to 
laugh sardonically at the petty struggles of Eliot’s characters. In Middlemarch, the eternally 
prevaricating and hopelessly outmoded scholar Mr. Casaubon hopes that when he finally 
finishes his magnum opus The Key to All Mythologies, he will be able to snub “his old 
acquaintance Carp,” “the author of that depreciatory recension which was kept locked in a 
small drawer of Mr Casaubon’s desk, and also in a dark closet of his verbal memory” (314). 
This initial choice of appellation might by itself simply be a Dickensian kind of naming, a 
  
wordplay on the notion of “carping” critics. On the next page, however, the free indirect 
discourse returns to reflect on Casaubon’s planned monograph: 
[T]here was to be a Latin dedication about which everything was uncertain except that it was 
not to be addressed to Carp: it was a poisonous regret to Mr. Casaubon that he had once 
addressed a dedication to Carp in which he had numbered that member of the animal 
kingdom among the viros nullo ævo perituros, a mistake which would infallibly lay the 
dedicator open to ridicule in the next age, and might even be chuckled over by Pike and 
Tench in the present. (315) 
As Keith Thomas, David Salter and others have traced through medieval and early modern 
literature, animals’ proximity to – but difference from – humans have long made animal 
analogies a powerful means for considering what makes us human (Thomas; Salter). Eliot’s 
choice of fishy names can be seen as belonging to this age-old tradition of caricaturing or 
archetyping character types through animals, what John Berger describes as “putting on a 
mask ... to unmask” (18). This fishy naming, however, does not show animals “fading 
away” (Berger 18), but in its play on taxonomy, seems to expose Eliot’s anxiety at their 
(our) omnipresence. The marvel of Eliot’s work is that we cannot know – and never know – 
to what extent this is a joke. Is Casaubon himself making this joke? Or – more plausibly – is 
the narrator making this joke at his expense? If so, our trust in his solidity as a realist 
character (with an “equivalent centre of self”) is momentarily shaken, as he briefly becomes 
a caricature (Eliot, Middlemarch 243). Why would Eliot, famed as the creator of three-
dimensional, fleshed-out characters, choose to reduce Casaubon to caricature here? Perhaps 
to show that this is how he views others. The technique identifies him as someone so 
absorbed with his own self-aggrandizement that he can forget the equal consciousness of his 
fellow humans.  
  
In a similarly unsettling passage in Felix Holt, Eliot makes a more explicit link between 
animals and evolutionary ancestry. In her description of the tragic aristocrat Mrs. 
Transome’s preoccupation with family lineage, she substitutes humans with animal 
equivalents:  
[G]enealogies entered into her stock of ideas, and her talk on such subjects was as necessary 
as the notes of the linnet or the blackbird. She had no ultimate analysis of things that went 
beyond blood and family – the Herons of Fenshore or the Badgers of Hillbury. (494) 
The first two animals (linnet and blackbird) function in a conventional simile. The second, 
however, is rather stranger: are they humans with animal names, or (imaginary) animals 
being set up as humans? This strange elision pulls in two different directions: it animalizes 
humans (Mrs. Transome as much as those imaginary “Herons” and “Badgers”) but it also 
humanizes animals, “destabilizing boundaries in both directions” as Denenholz Morse and 
Danahay describe the Darwinian effect (2). Beer offers a useful description of Eliot’s tone 
when referring directly to the idea of natural selection, as a “faintly facetious orotund style 
... to which she is driven by ideas that cause her deep disquiet and which she cannot yet 
repudiate” (Darwin’s Plots 147). The “facetious orotund” nature of these allusions make 
them hard to pin down to any single implication. Such images as that of the “Herons of 
Fenshore” and “Badgers of Hillbury” remind Eliot’s first readers of the fluid and even 
artificial nature of the division between humans and other organisms. It even suggests that 
our actions might be biologically determined.  
We can see both the familiarity of Eliot’s metonymy and its radicalism by 
comparing it with a superficially similar moment of novelistic mockery towards characters 
who emphasize lineage at the expense of self-awareness. In Gaskell’s novella “My Lady 
Ludlow” (1858–59), set similarly back in time (here into the 1800s), our protagonist’s 
mother claims a measure of social worth from a treasured “pair of ruffles ... which could not 
  
be bought new for love or money” (9). These “showed, as she said, that her ancestors had 
been Somebodies, when the grandfathers of the rich folk, who now looked down upon her, 
had been Nobodies – if, indeed, they had any grandfathers at all” (9–10). Locating her 
personal value in the past, she shares an approach to genealogy with Felix Holt’s Mrs. 
Transome. Both characters approach the issue of inheritance so fixated on personal 
validation that they fail to notice that the possession of forebears is a trait common to all 
living beings. 
Gaskell even makes her aristocrat compare herself with animals. Lady Ludlow 
attempts to disassociate herself from animals as a mark of her good breeding, but the 
attempt is surreptitiously undermined in its narration. In a discursive passage about her 
superior sense of smell, Lady Ludlow expresses distaste for musk, because  
no scent derived from an animal could ever be of a sufficiently pure nature to give pleasure to 
any person of good family, where, of course, the delicate perception of the senses had been 
cultivated for generations. She would instance the way in which sportsmen preserve the breed 
of dogs who have shown keen scent; and how such gifts descend for generations among 
animals, who cannot be supposed to have anything of ancestral pride, or hereditary fancies 
about them. (46) 
Like Mrs. Transome, who unconsciously associates herself with animals in her attempts at 
genealogical pride, Lady Ludlow unwittingly associates herself with hunting dogs to bolster 
her claim to superior qualities: were her ancestors really bred for their sense of smell? In its 
narration here, her claim is implicitly subverted. By reminding us that dogs are innocent of 
“ancestral pride, or hereditary fancies,” our narrator suggests that Lady Ludlow does have 
both these traits, with “fancies” in particular suggesting that this superhuman sense of smell 
may be merely illusory. Gaskell, however – writing, pre-Origin, in 1858 – is not really 
eliding her aristocrat with those dogs: merely suggesting that she is deluded in the claim to 
  
superiority she makes through them. Eliot’s post-Origin novels, by contrast, introduce an 
unsettling fluidity between humans and animals. 
In Felix Holt, we also catch a glimpse of how characters’ deluded self-
aggrandizement can be passed on to the next generation: not by biological but by material 
inheritance, and by the upbringing that comes with it. At the end of the scene in which 
Felix’s mother and the little boy she cares for appear uninvited at Transome Court, the 
infant heir Harry raises a protest against “the threatened departure of Job, who had seemed 
an invaluable addition to the menagerie of tamed creatures” (546). This momentary insight 
into the mind of the toddler reflects badly on the pampered but isolated upbringing he has 
had from his father. Harold Transome’s relative disregard for his son, leaving him overseas 
to arrive belatedly at Transome Court in the care of a servant, has stunted Harry’s emotional 
development, leading him to believe that other human beings exist simply to serve in his 
“menagerie.” Eliot’s choice of the term “menagerie” – the preserve of royalty and 
aristocracy – adds a critique of class relation too, eliding the dehumanizing effects of both 
species and class division. Those from the working underclass are perceived as sub-human 
playthings just as much as other animal species are. Here, therefore, Eliot highlights how 
those who think of other humans as animals tend – fallaciously – to exempt themselves from 
their own categories.  
This social commentary is something for which Eliot is famous, but the comic 
dimension of this is rarely acknowledged, nor its propensity to be expressed through cross-
species elision and even substitution. Eliot is often seen as a highly moral, even moralizing 
writer, and even during her lifetime her writings were often treated in a rather worshipful, 
almost ossified way. This is nowhere better epitomised than in Wise, Witty and Tender 
Sayings in Prose and Verse: Selected from the Works of George Eliot (1871), the book 
compiled by her devoted fan Alexander Main. He took chosen passages out of an often 
  
ironic context, to transform them into aphorisms (see Main). One classic example of this is 
her avowal, in Felix Holt, that “there is no private life which has not been determined by a 
wider public life.” However, this is followed by a rather strange example of this doctrine:  
… from the time when the primeval milkmaid had to wander with the wanderings of her clan, 
because the cow she milked was one of a herd which had made the pastures bare. Even in that 
conservatory existence where the fair Camelia [sic] is sighed for by the noble young 
Pineapple, neither of them needing to care about the frost or rain outside, there is a nether 
apparatus of hot-water pipes liable to cool down on a strike of the gardeners or a scarcity of 
coal. (129)  
Although the full quotation was included in Main’s book, that second half is unsurprisingly 
not often used as an aphorism. Why does Eliot choose to undercut herself like this? The 
passage opens with another discussion about class and status, and an admission of the 
practical and instrumental relationships between humans and other species. The “primeval 
milkmaid” exploits her cow, but is also in thrall to its instinctive actions; gardeners (who 
might go on strike) are necessary to maintain the hothouse atmosphere required for the 
growing of camellias, pineapples and the young ladies and gentlemen whose lives are lived 
among such things. At this point the transferred imagery also becomes complete elision: we 
cannot know with certainty whether Camelia and Pineapple are standing in for humans, or if 
human characteristics are being assigned to fruit and flowers.  
 Elision between humans and animals can serve to minimize the reality and 
equivalent value of those humans – as when Harry Transome sees other lower-status 
humans as part of his “menagerie” – or in corollary to raise the status of the animals in 
question. Those who campaigned on behalf of animal rights in the nineteenth century often 
did so through a fear of facing similarly brutal treatment themselves. As Coral Lansbury has 
shown, for example, the anti-vivisection movement was fueled by an analogic fear for the 
  
ways that working-class patients could be used for experimentation by middle-class doctors, 
and from women who saw their repeated physical abasement at the hands of men echoed in 
the repeatedly vivisected “Old Brown Dog” (Lansbury). G. H. Lewes, by contrast, a notable 
proponent of vivisection, included both human and non-human species in his Physiology of 
Common Life (1859–60), but cautioned in Sea Side Studies (1858) against the self-
projecting “anthropomorphism” of reading either one into the other (Lewes 255, 365; see 
Richardson 143).  
Much of the power of recent human-animal studies research comes from its 
insistence on the need to take material animal existence seriously.
2
 At the same time, its 
scholars have questioned whether animal rights are fundamentally aided by elision with 
those of marginalized human groups (Lansbury; Fudge; Ortiz-Robles). Does this kind of 
elision subsume and eclipse as much as foreground? Erica Fudge affirms that the field of 
human-animal studies cannot be “the history of animals; such a thing is impossible. Rather, 
it is the history of human attitudes towards animals” (Fudge 6). As Wittgenstein highlighted 
in an oft-repeated phrase, even if a lion could speak, we would not understand what it said.  
To what extent is Eliot’s elision about “real” plants and animals? Real animals of 
course also populate these novels: the leveret whose poaching by young Dagley exposes the 
uncomfortable limits of Mr Brooke’s landlordly benevolence; the horses whose practical 
and symbolic importance have recently been highlighted (Linley); the pet dog with which 
Sir James attempts to woo Dorothea, only to be told (with perhaps unintentional candor) that 
she risks “treading on it. I am rather short-sighted” (Middlemarch 53; see Auerbach). 
Nonetheless, the interrelationship between the “real” and the figurative is much more 
permeable than any binary might suggest. Harriet Ritvo, for example, has shown not only 
how much the treatment of animals in the nineteenth century can illuminate social concerns, 
but also how our perception of “real” animals is shaped by their changing taxonomy and 
  
categorization (The Animal Estate; The Platypus and the Mermaid). Steve Baker’s work 
highlights just how pervasive, and flexible, animals are as cultural signifiers (especially for 
comic purposes), in cartoons, advertising and beyond: they “can apparently be used to mean 
anything and everything” (4). He insists, therefore, that “the representational, symbolic and 
rhetorical uses of the animal must be understood to carry as much conceptual weight as any 
idea we may have of the ‘real’ animal, and must be taken just as seriously” (10). As Akira 
Mizuta Lippit has described it, following Berger, “the animal is already a metaphor, the 
metaphor an animal” (Berger 7; Lippit 165).  
It is nonetheless worth being precise about the nature of the figurative language at 
work in Eliot’s usage here. There are animal metaphors in Eliot’s work, of course, and 
Chase Pielak (using Lippit’s term) has recently traced the “animetaphors” that pervade 
Daniel Deronda, as Gwendolen gradually shifts from a Lamia-esque “serpent,” via a horse 
that Grandcourt seeks to break, to a “kitten” and a “lap-dog,” to a “white doe” after 
Grandcourt’s death (Pielak 99; Daniel Deronda 12, 375, 547, 697). As Beer encapsulates, 
“Metaphor is pre-occupied with likeness in the unlike. It eschews origins. It marks out 
connection, not descent” (George Eliot 117). In my analysis, however, metaphor is not the 
most apt term. The crucial thing here is the elision: we do not know which is being 
described in terms of the other. Are “Camelia” and “Pineapple” primarily fruit and flowers, 
or pampered aristocracy? Thus we can best view this as metonymy: animals (and 
occasionally fruit and flowers) standing in for humans, to an extent that we do not know 
which to privilege. While metaphor often highlights the distinctness of the objects being 
compared – they have only one point of similarity – metonymy acts to elide the two sides of 
the equation. 
At certain points in Middlemarch those metonymic animals and some real ones do 
come into contact. This marks the apogee of human-animal elision, in the scene near the end 
  
of the novel that precipitates Dorothea’s night of anguish about her love for Will Ladislaw. 
This scene, in which Dorothea goes for tea at Mr. Farebrother’s house, is associated with 
natural history from the outset by a comparison of Farebrother to “White of Selborne” 
(842). He 
had just set up a pair of beautiful goats to be pets of the village in general, and to walk at 
large as sacred animals. The evening went by cheerfully till after tea, Dorothea talking more 
than usual and dilating with Mr Farebrother on the possible histories of creatures that 
converse compendiously with their antennae, and for aught we know may hold reformed 
parliaments; when suddenly some inarticulate little sounds were heard which called 
everybody’s attention. 
 “Henrietta Noble,” said Mrs Farebrother, seeing her small sister moving about the 
furniture-legs distressfully, “what is the matter?” 
 “I have lost my tortoise-shell lozenge-box. I fear the kitten has rolled it away,” said the 
tiny old lady, involuntarily continuing her beaver-like notes.” (843) 
The lozenge-box was a gift from “Mr. Ladislaw”, and Mrs. Farebrother explains the depth 
of her devotion to this gentleman with the comment, “If Henrietta Noble forms an 
attachment to any one ... she is like a dog – she would take their shoes for a pillow and sleep 
the better” (843). As the realization grows in Dorothea’s mind that she might not be the only 
person who loves Ladislaw – indeed, that she is the only one of Ladislaw’s devotees who 
has not expressed her love for him – she finds “her heart ... palpitating violently” (a repeated 
term, as we will see) and succumbs at last to her grief (843). Throughout this passage, the 
emphasis is on the interchangeable nature of the hierarchy between humans and animals: 
any confidence we might have in being loftily superior to the animal kingdom is misplaced 
and foolish. Animals can be “sacred”; the political state of insect society might be more 
advanced than that of Britain in May 1832; an elderly woman can sound like a “beaver” and 
behave like a “dog”. This is not an equal relationship, because a “tortoise” can be 
  
transformed into a gift from Germany; but a “kitten” can nonetheless take this treasured 
possession away. 
This is figured as a moment of crisis, of imminent breakdown, precisely through the 
profusion of animals. As Pielak has characterized it, in Eliot’s novels, “Animal imagery 
appears at the edge of the human, the point at which humanity gains and loses subjectivity 
.... Images of animals stand in the linguistic gaps – in the places words fail – to figure the 
subject. Animals appear at the end of the ability of language to mean” (99). Inarticulacy has 
long been one of the markers used by philosophers to distinguish animal from human 
species (see Midgley). But elision, not differentiation, is visible in the above scene. In line 
with Pielak’s analysis, Dorothea and Henrietta Noble’s anxiety and pain is exactly what 
prevents them from being able to articulate it. This also mirrors writers’ sense of inadequacy 
in trying to express the multifarious texture of lived – and living – history. “[T]he end of the 
ability of language to mean” could be a description of that sense of the overwhelming 
multiplicity of contemporaneous experience. 
 
All organisms, or just all humans? Darwinism vs. Humanism 
A profusion of animals, therefore, means trouble. Eliot might question the superiority of 
humans to other species, but her narrative voice oscillates between profusion and 
singularity, humanism and cross-species communion. The very next scene – arguably one of 
the most famous in Middlemarch – seems to demonstrate that engagement with other living 
selves is both necessary and valuable. This scene follows a night in which Dorothea has 
come to realize, with agonized lament, that she loves Will Ladislaw, and depicts her 
eventual epiphany. 
She opened her curtains, and looked out towards the bit of road that lay in view, with fields 
beyond, outside the entrance-gates. On the road there was a man with a bundle on his back 
  
and a woman carrying her baby; in the field she could see figures moving – perhaps the 
shepherd with his dog. Far off in the bending sky was the pearly light; and she felt the 
largeness of the world and the manifold wakings of men to labour and endurance. She was a 
part of that involuntary, palpitating life, and could neither look out on it from her luxurious 
shelter as a mere spectator, nor hide her eyes in selfish complaining. (846) 
In this passage, Eliot insists that all individuals, however insignificant or unsung, contribute 
to an organic unity, namely “life” in “the world,” which ranges across both class and species 
boundaries. Dorothea’s revelation stems from recognizing that she is “part” of this unitary 
life: it is a revelation of interpersonal sympathy in the broadest sense. 
What is not commonly noted in readings of this passage is how Eliot’s choice of 
adjectives – “involuntary” and “palpitating” – mirrors the equally famous earlier passage 
that reflects on finding Dorothea “in a fit of weeping six weeks after her wedding” (Eliot, 
Middlemarch 226). Here, the narratorial voice comments: 
That element of tragedy which lies in the very fact of frequency, has not yet wrought itself 
into the coarse emotion of mankind; and perhaps our frames could hardly bear much of it. If 
we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass 
grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side 
of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity. (226) 
Few actions are more “involuntary” than the growing of the grass; and what better illustrates 
the term “palpitating” than the beating of a squirrel’s heart? By the end of the novel, 
therefore, Dorothea has achieved what the narrator had earlier claimed to be impossible: to 
be conscious of the “roar which lies on the other side of silence,” but to withstand it and use 
it for “the growing good of the world” (Eliot, Middlemarch 896). When Eliot describes the 
“diffusive” actions of unsung individuals as “unhistoric acts” in the novel’s final sentence, 
she both foregrounds and negates her own point (Middlemarch 896). By their very 
  
frequency and ordinariness, such actions – and the creatures who enact them – are decidedly 
part of history. 
This pair of passages seems to suggest that an organic view of life on Earth, which 
refuses hierarchies between humans, plants and animals, can be liberating. Such an 
organicist doctrine, however, is presented in Eliot’s writings as raising as many challenges 
as it solves. Its problems quickly become apparent once we examine the broad intertextual 
antecedents of the “roar on the other side of silence.” Neil Hertz has shown how the image 
echoes John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). However, while 
the Middlemarch passage has often been taken as a condemnation of the narrowly blinkered 
and callous sympathies of human society, Hertz glosses Locke as “prais[ing] the aptness 
with which the human senses are scaled to Man’s position in the hierarchy of creatures” 
(40). The seventeenth-century philosopher muses that 
If our sense of hearing were but a thousand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual 
noise distract us. And we should in quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than 
in the middle of a sea-fight. ... [The individual of acute hearing] would be in a different world 
from other people: nothing would appear the same to him and others. (Locke 403) 
As Hertz points out, “Locke’s language converts a scaled continuum into a binary 
opposition” (41). What could be deemed a biological or social advantage – acute hearing – 
is rendered a handicap, forcing the individual suffering from this malady into a position of 
social alienation, unable to identify with his fellow men.  
The most direct source of Eliot’s intertextuality was probably not Locke’s Essay but 
an article “On the Physical Basis of Human Life” by T. H. Huxley, published in February 
1869 as Eliot was just beginning to write her novel. Huxley himself clearly drew on Locke 
for his depiction of “the wonderful noonday silence of a tropical forest,” which  
  
is, after all, due only to the dullness of our hearing; and could our ears catch the murmur of 
those tiny Maelstroms, as they whirl in the innumerable myriads of living cells which 
constitute each tree, we should be stunned, as with the roar of a great city. (Huxley 132) 
The intertextual echo through the three passages extends beyond ideas to specific imagery: 
all three referring to the sense of “hearing,” and Eliot picking up on Huxley’s term “roar” 
that closely echoes Locke’s “noise.” Hertz uses Immanuel Kant’s distinction between the 
“dynamically” and “mathematically” sublime to illuminate Eliot’s anxiety about “that roar 
which lies on the other side of silence” (Kant 78). The “dynamic” is that conventional 
Romantic sublime of huge, awe-inspiring scale: landscapes, storms, etc. The “mathematical 
sublime” results by contrast from overwhelming multiplicity, in Hertz’s words “a sort of 
cognitive overload, a losing track of what one is taking in” (1). This is none other than the 
problem already highlighted as a particular concern of post-Darwinian experience: that of 
filtering and distilling the multiplicity of contemporaneous experience into any singular 
narrative. 
 So can interpersonal sympathy come from a closer attention to the suffering of 
others? Even within that famous “squirrel” passage, the answer is not so straightforward. In 
the first place, does that famous “roar on the other side of silence” signify suffering? (Eliot, 
Middlemarch 226) Eliot evokes it in the context of “tragedy,” specifically the tragedy of 
“frequency,” but it would be difficult to argue convincingly that the life and growth of 
squirrels and grass equates directly to suffering: if anything, they imply a pastoral idyll. 
Secondly, does it signify an extension of sympathy to all species? The animal simile might 
seem to suggest it, but any such reading is instantly undermined by Eliot’s specific use of it 
to illustrate ‘all ordinary human life’ (226; my italics). Such is the power of Eliot’s work 
that it can move and compel us even when its nuances are so diffused as to self-contradict.  
  
What is more, even though Middlemarch is often read as advocating heightened 
attention to the suffering of others, comparison with Eliot’s 1859 novella “The Lifted Veil” 
challenges any such reading. Its main character, Latimer, suffers from a terrible and 
destructive malady, namely the uncontrollable ability to read other people’s minds. This he 
describes, in strikingly similar terms to those used in the Middlemarch passage, as “like a 
preternaturally heightened sense of hearing, making audible to one a roar of sound where 
others find perfect stillness” (“The Lifted Veil” 18). It becomes increasingly clear over the 
course of the text that being “preternaturally” sensitive to the minutiae of human suffering – 
and human selfishness – is actually counterproductive, inducing inertia, “weariness and 
disgust,” rather than constructive action (18). After his first extended prophetic experience, 
Latimer comments, “Already I had begun to taste something of the horror that belongs to 
the lot of a human being whose nature is not adjusted to simple human conditions” (12). Far 
from equipping Latimer to interact more fruitfully in human society, it serves to alienate 
him from those around him. 
An example of microscopic sensitivity being similarly counterproductive can be 
seen in Eliot’s last novel, Daniel Deronda (1876). The scene in question starts with an 
admission that Daniel was in the  
sort of contemplative mood perhaps more common in the young men of our day – that of 
questioning whether it were worth while to take part in the battle of the world: I mean, of 
course, the young men in whom the unproductive labour of questioning is sustained by three 
or five per cent on capital which somebody else has battled for. (185) 
This is another subtle undulation between different perspectives: first, a sympathetic 
alignment with Daniel’s predicament; then a satirical undercutting, revealing Daniel to be 
just as disingenuous as the artificially sheltered Camelia and Pineapple. On this particular 
evening, rowing on the Thames in a “contemplative mood,” Daniel spends a few minutes  
  
forgetting everything else in a half-speculative, half-involuntary identification of himself with 
the objects he was looking at, thinking how far it might be possible habitually to shift his 
centre till his own personality would be no less outside him than the landscape, – when the 
sense of something moving on the bank opposite him ... made him turn his glance 
thitherward. (189) 
What he finds is the destitute Mirah, believing that no-one in the world cares for her, and 
about to try and kill herself. As Rebecca Mitchell has argued, for all Eliot’s focus on 
altruism, in fact what her characters require is not a complete identity or elision with those 
around us, but a recognition of their otherness, their alterity (312). The “veil” that is lifted 
for Latimer is necessary to keep us all on an equal footing with those around us. Without it, 
we become like Locke’s hypothetical man of acute hearing, who is cut off from his fellow 
human-beings. This is a bodily as well as an intellectual veil: it is partly the physiological 
difference between us and those Lowick parsonage ants that prevents us knowing about 
their community’s proximity to “reformed Parliaments.”  
Thus, a wider examination of Eliot’s late fiction evokes both the proximity and the 
alterity of humans and animals. Eliot recognizes our propensity to anthropomorphize 
through self-projection, just as she had argued for God as a self-projection of humanity in 
her translation of Ludwig Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity (1843; translation 1854). 
However, she effectively rejects as impossible any extension of sympathetic union to 
animals. My analysis suggests that this results not primarily from any intellectual 
deficiencies of theirs, but through ours. While Eliot has often been read as condemning that 
“wadd[ing]” of stupidity, I propose that, in a way now being productively challenged by 
modern human-animal studies, she views some calibrated “dullness” of our emotional 
hearing as essential so that we may prioritize communication with fellow humans and 
function in the world. She ultimately suggests that although humans may desire a 
  
relationship between the individual and their surroundings (whether that be contemporary 
history, or other animals) in which there is no alterity between the two, our own sympathetic 
limitations are such that it would be unbearable. 
 When animals appear in uncanny profusion in Eliot’s fiction, it is generally a sign 
that characters are following the wrong path. The presence of animals in such carnivalesque, 
topsy-turvy positions evidently shows Eliot struggling with a post-Darwinian universe. But 
although she uses Darwinian rhetoric in ways that recognize the biological proximity 
between humans and animals, she ultimately advances a humanist philosophy that refutes 
her one-time confidant Herbert Spencer’s celebration of the “survival of the fittest.” It 
argues that what marks out humans from other species is that they have a solemn duty 
towards one another. Fudge reminds us how history is intrinsically founded on setting 
ourselves apart. She and others in human-animal studies seek to conceive a new historical 
mode that takes Foucault’s destabilizing insights further by “go[ing] beyond the human” 
(Fudge 14). A century and a half earlier, by contrast, Eliot recognized the proximity of 
humans and animals but could not fit them into history. In “On the Uses and Disadvantages 
of History for Life” (1874) a few years after Middlemarch, Nietzsche would write of how 
the placid cow is lucky because it lives solely in the moment, with no memory and thus no 
“chain” of history to drag around in its wake (61). He suggests that one of “man’s” 
problems is that “he refuses to be like an animal” (60). For Eliot, however, our historicism is 
what makes us human.  
 The implications of Darwinian theory are manifold and potentially conflicting, 
which is why so many Victorian intellectuals, even those who would claim the new label of 
“scientist,” resisted or remodeled it in their own image. His non-directional, constantly 
diffusive plots were too horrifying for some to countenance. Eliot, by contrast, going 
beyond  the all-connectedness traced by Beer, hones in on and gives expression to one of its 
  
most discomforting aspects, overwhelming multiplicity. This arises, I would argue, from her 
fascination and concern with representing her society’s recent and rapidly changing past, 
and shaping it into the comprehensible narrative of what we would call contemporary 
history. The multiplicity of contemporaneous experience is multiplied a thousand-fold when 
we expand our perception to include other species.  
 
 
Notes 
 
[1] These include Charlotte Brontë’s Shirley (1849; set 1811–12); Elizabeth Gaskell’s “My Lady 
Ludlow” (1858-9; set through a series of bracketing narrators in the 1780s, 1790s and 1800s), 
Sylvia’s Lovers (1863; set in the 1790s) and Wives and Daughters (1866; set in the late 1820s and 
early 1830s). For further discussion of the divergence between history and novel genres in narrating 
the recent past, see Helen Kingstone, Victorian narratives of the recent past: within living memory 
(Palgrave, 2017). 
[2] For example, Donna Haraway lambasts Deleuze and Guattari’s vision of ‘Becoming-Animal’ 
because of what she sees as their disregard, even ‘scorn’, for ‘all that is mundane and ordinary’ in 
‘actual animals’ (Haraway 27; Deleuze and Guattari). 
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